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The Demise of the Emergency Doctrine of Procedural Due Process: Mackey v.
Montrym —Under the Massachusetts automobile implied consent law,' a
motorist arrested for drunken driving is required to take a breathalyzer test
when requested to do so by an arresting police officer. The statute provides
that if upon such arrest the driver refuses a police officer's request to take a
breathalyzer test, his license shall be summarily suspended for ninety days.
The Registrar of Motor Vehicles has no discretion in ordering suspension
once he has received the arresting officer's report of the incident. 3 Upon
surrendering his license, however, a driver is entitled to an immediate hearing
before the Registrar,' but the Massachusetts statute contains no provision for
notifying the licensee that such a hearing is available.
Appellee Donald Montrym's license was suspended pursuant to this stat-
ute.' Prior to suspension of Montrym's license, however, a state court dis-
' 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1979). This section
provides in relevant part:
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way ... shall be
deemed to have consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his
breath in the event that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of inmxicating liquor .... If the person arrested re-
fuses 0) submit to such test or analysis, after having been informed that his
license ... to operate motor vehicles ... shall be suspended for a period of
ninety days for such refusal, • .. the police officer before whom such re-
fusal was made shall immediately prepare a written report of such re-
fusal „ Upon receipt of .such report, the registrar shall suspend any
license or permit to operate motor vehicles issued to such person ... for a
period of ninety days.
Id.
Id.
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(g) (West Supp. 1979) provides that
Any person whose license, permit or right to operate has been sus-
pended under paragraph (I) shall be entitled to a hearing before the regis-
trar which shall be limited to the following issues: (1) did the police officer
have reasonable grounds to believe that such person had been operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor upon any
way or in any place to which the public has a right of access or upon any
way or in any place to which members of the public have a right of access
as invitees or licensees, (2) was such person placed under arrest, and (3)
did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis. If, after such
hearing, the registrar finds on any one of the said issues in the negative,
the registrar shall reinstate such license, permit or right to operate.
Id.
Appellee Donald Montrynt was arrested on May 15, 1976, for driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and driving to endanger, after his vehicle was in-
volved in a collision in Massachusetts at about 8:15 P.M. At the police station, Mon-
trym refused to take a breathalyzer lest when requested to do so at about 8:45 P.M.
He later argued that he had not been advised by the police officer of the summary
suspension penalty that would attach if he refused. Twenty minutes later, after con-
sulting with his lawyer, Montrym sought to retract his refusal, but the officers declined
his request.. They relied on the portion of the statute which states that once a person
has refused to take the test "no such test or analysis shall be made but the police
officer before whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written report
of such refusal." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1979). The
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missed the complaint brought against appellee for driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.' Dismissal apparently was predicated on the officer's
refusal to administer the breathalyzer test after appellee had sought to retract
his initial refusal.' Appellee's attorney immediately wrote the Registrar in-
forming him of the dismissal of the charge but failed to enclose a certified
copy of the court's order.' The Registrar formally suspended appellee's
license, which was surrendered on the following day." Appellee did not exer-
cise his right to a hearing before the Registrar but filed for an immediate
administrative appeal and, through his counsel, demanded return of his
license.
Appellee then chose to forego the administrative appeal and instead
brought a class action suit in the United States district court.'° Montrym
claimed that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional on its face for fail-
ing to provide a hearing prior to suspension in accordance with due process
requirements. The district court granted appellee's motion for pretrial sum-
mary judgment on the basis of stipulated facts." Relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Bell v. Burson, 12 the district court declared the statute un-
constitutional on its face for violating the due process clause. 13 The court.
concluded that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed Montrym some form
of pre-suspension hearing." On motion of the Registrar, the court reconsid-
ered its opinion in the light of Dixon v. Love,'`' a Supreme Court decision
which in the interim had upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois statute
authorizing the summary suspension of a driver's license prior to an eviden-
tiary hearing. Distinguishing Love on several grounds, the court denied the
Registrar's motion to reconsider the denial of his prior motions for a stay and
modification of judgment."
On direct appeal, in a five to four decision, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the district court and HELD: a state's interest in promoting
public safety on its highways without undue administrative or fiscal burden
outweighs a driver's substantial interest in the continued possession and use of
" Id.
7
 Id. at 5-6.
8
 Id. at 6.
" Id. at 6-7.
1 " Id, at 8.
" Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Mass. 1977).
12
 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See text at note 33 infra.
" Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Mass. 1977).
14
 Id. at 399.
" 431 U.S. 105 (1977). Sec text at note 39 infra.
r" Montrym v. Panora, 438 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (D. Mass. 1977). The majority
distinguished Love on three grounds. First, it found the private interest at stake under
the Massachusetts scheme greater than that in Love, because the Massachusetts statute
fails to provide for any form of emergency relief. Second, it saw a much greater risk
of error under the Massachusetts procedures than under Illinois law which bases sus-
pension on a record of fully adjudicated criminal convictions. Finally, the majority
concluded that the Massachusetts statute does not. enhance highway safety to the ex-
tent that the Illinois statute does, because it removes from the road only those drivers
who refuse to take the breathalyzer test, not those who take the test and fail it. Id. at
1159-61. The dissenting judge thought that Love controlled. Id. at 1161.
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his driver's license and justifies the summary suspension of the license of an
alleged drunken driver pending a prompt post-deprivation hearing.' 7
Employing the balancing. test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge," the Court
further held that a state's suspension procedures must reasonably guard
against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible property interest.'" The
Court nevertheless found the requirement of a corroborated police affidavit
to be a sufficiently reliable safeguard against a possible erroneous depriva-
tion 2° and upheld the Massachusetts statute. 21 In contrast to the majority,
the four dissenting justices concluded that the state's interests were not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify establishing an exception to the traditional re-
quirement of a hearing before a state may act finally to deprive a person of a
protectible property interest.'- 2
In Monirym the Supreme Court has taken a significant step toward limit-
ing the traditional due process requirement of pre-deprivation hearings when
property interests are at stake." By upholding the Massachusetts scheme of
summary license suspensions, the Court has replaced its clue process require-
17 Mackey v. Mcmtrym, 433 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
18
 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
1 " 433 U.S. at 13.
20 Id. at 14.
21 Id. at 19.
22 Id. at 21-22. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1
(1978); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23 In 1978, at the time the appeal was taken, twelve states in addition to Mas-
sachusetts provided for license suspensions without a prior hearing. Six of these had
not been subject to constitutional challenge:
ALA. CODE § 32-6-16 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (1975); IowA CODE
ANN. § 321.137-138 (West Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-11-21 to 23
(1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32.2142.1-2 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1969).
Four statutes had been upheld by state court decisions:
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.441 (Vernon) (upheld, Jones v. Schaffner, 509
S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1974)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262-A-69e (Supp. 1972)
(upheld, Daneault v. Clarke, 113 N.H. 481, 309 A.2d 884 (1973)); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 64-22-2.12 (1953) (upheld, In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506
P.2c1 1204 (1973)); N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1972)
(upheld. Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 178, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1958)).
Two such statutes had been indirectly affirmed by state supreme courts:
DEL. Com: tit. 21, § 2742 (1974) (Broughton v. Warren, 281 A.2d 625 (Del.
Ch. 1971)); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29, § 1312(2) . (Supp. 1976) (Opinion of the
justices, 255 A.2d 643 (Me. 1969)).
The three federal courts which had had occasion to deal with thc constitutionality of
such statutes have struck them down as a denial of due process:
Chavez v. Campbell, 397 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Ariz. 1973), striking ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 28-691; Stone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transportation, 379 F. Supp.
652 (E.D. Ky. 1974), striking Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.565; Holland v. Parker,
469 F.2(1 1(113 (8th Cir. 1972) (S. Dak.), striking S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 32-23-10.
Following Schnierber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), such statutes would most
likely be held as not violative of the right against self-incrimination and the right
against unlawful searches and seizures.
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meat of a pre-deprivation hearing in all but emergency circumstances with an
approach which requires a pre-deprivation hearing only when the private in-
terests at stake outweigh those interests advanced by the state. The Eldridge
balancing of interests test, 24
 originally adopted by the Court to determine
merely the type of pre-deprivation hearing required in a given circumstance,
is now used to determine whether a hearing is required at all.
Cases in which the Court has used this approach 25
 suggest that a state no
longer need assert traditional emergency circumstances to justify the omission
of a pre-deprivation hearing. While these cases have involved only suspen-
sions of state licenses, the substantiality test now employed suggests that a
private individual will have difficulty asserting a property interest of sufficient
weight to compel such a hearing. Furthermore, in the absence of a prior hear-
ing, the Court requires only that the pre-deprivation procedures provide min-
imal safeguards to insure against the possibility of erroneous deprivations.
These safeguards need not include an opportunity for response by the indi-
vidual faced with immediate deprivation. Thus, while the Court does require
a prompt post-deprivation hearing when summary procedures are used, Man-
tiym nevertheless will increase the possibility of erroneous deprivations of
property by refusing to require adequate pre-deprivation safeguards against
state error.
This casenote will examine how the Court in Montrym applied the Eldridge
three-pronged test to determine whether a hearing is required prior to sus-
pending a driver's license. It will first explain the components of the Eldridge
test and review the driver's license cases which recently have come before the
Court. The reasoning employed by the majority and dissenting opinions in
Montrym will then be examined. After a brief discussion of procedural due
process requirements as they existed prior to Montrym, the Montrym opinion
will be analyzed in the light of these requirements. It. will be suggested that.
Montrym demonstrates that the Court has modified substantially the traditional
due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
the deprivation of property. Finally, this casenote will suggest that a pre-
deprivation hearing could he provided without unduly burdening the attain-
ment of legitimate state objectives.
I. MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE. AND THE DRIVERS' LICENSE CASES
The three-pronged balancing test. employed by the Court in Montrym was
first articulated fully in Mathews v. Eldridge. 2' The Court developed the test
to determine the requirements of clue process when a state seeks to deprive a
person of a protectible property interest. In Eldridge, the Court considered
whether the clue process clause requires that a recipient of Social Security
benefits be given the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the ter-
mination of such benefits. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, recognized
24 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
25 ,We, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105
(1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2 " 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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at the outset the recipient's property interest in such benefits." He also
acknowledged that prior rulings of the Court required that notice and some
meaningful opportunity for response be provided to a recipient before a state
may finally terminate such an interest." Having recognized a protectible
property interest, Justice Powell then considered the nature of the hearing
that due process would require. In so doing he formulated a test to determine
the type of hearing necessary and to evaluate the administrative procedures
provided by statute." The test sets forth three factors for consideration:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."
These factors were then weighed to test the sufficiency of the procedures
used to terminate the payment of Social Security benefits.
After balancing the interests involved and the procedures used, Justice
Powell concluded that a full hearing was not necessary. The majority found
that since discontinuance of benefits rested on a sharply focused and easily
documented medical assessment, and since the recipient had full access to all
the information relied upon by the state as well as an opportunity to respond
before a final decision was made, due process did not require a more elabo-
rate hearing procedure than that provided by the agency involved."
Prior to Mackey v. Montrym, the Supreme Court had twice considered the
state's right to deprive a private citizen of his driver's license without a prior
hearing.32
 In Bell v. Burson," the Court established that a driver has a pro-
tectible property interest in his driver's license which cannot be denied with-
out the procedural due process required by the fourteenth amendment. 34
Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act required that the license of
an uninsured motorist involved in an accident be suspended unless the
motorist posted security to cover the amount of the damages claimed by ag-
grieved parties." An administrative hearing was conducted prior to the sus-
pension, but it excluded any assessment of the motorist's fault in the accident.
The Court held that since potential liability was an important factor under the
scheme, the state could not, consistent, with clue process, exclude consideration
of fault from its prior hearing. 36 The Court, however, declined to require a
27
 Id. at 332.
28 Id. at 335.
2" Id.
" Id. at 335.
34 Id. at 345-46.
32 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
33 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
34 Id. at 539.
35 Id. at 535-36.
34; Id. at 541.
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full adjudication of the question of liability. 37 While recognizing the existence
of an emergency exception to due process requirements, the Court. nonethe-
less held that this situation did not present such an emergenCy. 38
After Burson, the Court in Dixon v. Love 3 " upheld an Illinois statute which
mandates license suspension without a prior hearing for a driver who has
accumulated a record of three traffic violations within a twelve-month
period. 4 " The Court acknowledged the driver's protectible property interest
but nevertheless concluded that clue process does not require a hearing prior
to suspension. Employing the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the Court
found that a state's interest in highway safety sufficiently outweighs a driver's
interest in his license to justify the initial summary process. 4 ' The Court
noted that each of the prior convictions concerned in such a case have been
fully adjudicated and that additional procedures would therefore be unlikely
to have a significant value in reducing the number of erroneous depriva-
tions, 42
 It noted further that the statute contains a special provision for
hardship cases and for holders of commercial licenses.'" Consequently, the
Court found that where the interests of the state outweigh those of the indi-
vidual, and where sufficient procedural safeguards are available, a person's
license can be suspended without a prior hearing. It is against the background
of these cases that the Court decided Montrym.
II. THE MONTRYM DECISION
A. The Majority's Rationale
In approaching the due process issue in Montrym, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, accepted the initial premise that a driver's license is a
protectible property interest." Having clone this, he then attempted to de-
" Id. at 540.
38 Id. at 542.
39 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
" The Illinois statute authorizes suspension or revocation where a licensee:
[hias been convicted of not less than 3 offenses against traffic regula-
tions governing the movement of vehicles ... committed within any 12
month period so as to indicate the disrespect for traffic laws and a disre-
gard for the safety of other persons on the highways; conviction upon 3
charges of violation of Section 11-601 of this Act committed within a
period of 12 months shall be deemed grounds for the revocation or sus-
pension of a license or permit under this Section ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 95V2, § 6-206(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
Upon suspending or revoking the license ... the Secretary of State
shall immediately notify such person in writing of the order revoking or
suspending the license or permit.
Id. § 6-206(e)(1).
41
 431 U.S. at 115 (1977).
42 Id. at 113-14.
43 Id. at 113.
" 443. U.S. at 10.
A separate line of due process cases dealing with termination of government
employment has developed a mode of analysis to determine whether or not a protecti-
ble property interest is at stake at all. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);




termitic what process was due in order to prevent an erroneous deprivation
of that interest. 45 As had the district court," the Supreme Court sought its
answer in the balancing test developed earlier in Matthews v. Eldridge.'" In
contrast to the lower court, however, the Supreme Court found the facts be-
fore it to be indistinguishable from those of Dixon v. Love and, therefore,
concluded that a pre-suspension hearing was not necessary to satisfy due proc-
ess requirements."
The Court first examined the private interest at stake in Monlrym.
Acknowledging that a person's interest in the continued possession and use of
his license to drive is a substantial one, the Court nevertheless found it less
substantial than the interest involved in Love. Under the Massachusetts statute,
suspension occurs for a maximum of ninety days, while the Illinois scheme
permits suspension for up to a year. 45 Additionally, the Court noted that
while a provision for hardship relief exists in the Illinois statute, it is available
only after the driver's license has been suspended and the driver has dem-
onstrated his eligibility for such relief." An ordinary post-suspension hear-
ing does not have to be granted for twenty days," while a Massachusetts
driver is entitled to a hearing before the Registrar immediately upon suspen-
sion. 52
 Thus, the Court ruled that the district court was in error in failing to
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). According to the analysis of these
cases, a protected property interest. exists only to the extent that it has been granted
protection by the applicable statute. "[T]he sufficiency of [a] claim of entitlement must.
be decided by reference to state law." 426 U.S. at 344 (footnote omitted). Speaking for
the Court in Arnett v. Kennedy, justice Rehnquist declared that "[w]here the grant Of
a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures
which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of the
appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." 416 U.S. at 1531154. At least one scholar
has remarked upon the Court's preference for avoiding the "balancing" approach by
using the Arnett analysis to find that there is no property interest for the due process
clause to protect. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 29 n.5 (1976). The Court might well have adopted a similar mode of
analysis here were it not for the fact that prior to its development the Court had
already declared a driver's license to be a protected property interest. Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
45
 443 U.S. at 10.
46 Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 398-400 (D. Mass. 1977).
47 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See text at note 30 supra.
48
 443 U.S. at 11.
49 Id.
5" Id. at 12. The Illinois statute provides that in limited circumstances a person
whose license is suspended or revoked may obtain a restricted permit for commercial
use or in case of hardship by submitting to the Secretary of State an affidavit setting
forth facts establishing his eligibility for relief. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110 n.7
(1977).
5 ' Id. at 109-10.
52 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90, § 24(1)(g) (West Supp. 1979). While the law
itself merely provides that a person whose license is suspended "shall be entitled to a
hearing before the registrar ... ," the parties stipulated that the hearing would be
available the moment the driver surrenders his license. 443 U.S. at 7-8 n.5. The Regis-
trar represented that a decision could be obtained within one or two days of the re-
ceipt of the suspension notice. Id.
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consider the relative length of suspension periods and the timeliness of post-
suspension review in assessing the weight of the private interest involved.''
• The Court moved next to the second step of the Eldridge test by consider-
ing the likelihood that an erroneous deprivation might result from the proce-
dure used." Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Court's construction
of the due process clause had never required that the procedures used to
guard against erroneous deprivations be perfectly error-free." Additionally,
when prompt post-deprivation review is available to correct administrative er-
rors, the Court generally has required only that the pre-deprivation process
provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the
official action are as the government official warrants them to be." As a
result, the majority found that the procedures called for in the Massachusetts
statute are sufficiently reliable to meet this standard.
The Court equated the criteria required under the Massachusetts sum-
mary suspension law with the objective facts relied upon in Love. 57 The Il-
linois statute at issue m Love calls for license suspension after a driver has
been convicted of three traffic violations in one year." Under the Mas-
sachusetts statute, cause for license suspension arises if the driver has been
arrested for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, if there is
probable cause for arrest, and if the driver refuses to take a breathalyzer test.
Such refusal must be witnessed by a third person.''" Thus, the Court. ruled
that the district court had overstated the risk of error in the statute's reliance
on the affidavit of a law-enforcement officer. It emphasized that such an of-
ficer is well-suited by his training as an observer and investigator to make the
determination required of him." It also pointed out that the arresting of-
ficer would ordinarily have provided the driver with an informal opportunity
to tell his side of the story."' The Court added that since the officer is per-
sonally subject to civil liability for unlawful arrest, he has every incentive to
report the facts accurately and truthfully."
While finding the arresting officer well-suited to make the determination
required under the Massachusetts statute, the Court acknowledged that a
material clerical error or deficiency could exist in his report. Chief Justice
Burger saw little value, however, in the pre-suspension non-evidentiary hear-
ing contemplated by the district court." He found that as the statute is cur-
'a 433 U.S. at 12. The district court on rehearing had emphasized the lack of
provision for emergency relief in the Massachusetts statute. Montrym v. Panora, 438 F.
Stipp. 1157, 1159 (D. Mass. 1977).
54
 443 U.S. at 13-17.
55




 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 108 n.3 (1977).
5''
	 GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90,	 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1979). See note 2
supra.
r` 0
 443 U.S. at 14.
"' Id.
"2 Id.
"" Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 399 (D. Mass. 1977).
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rently written the Registrar's scrutiny of the officer's report for errors filled
essentially the same function as would a hearing." The Registrar would note
any errors or deficiencies; if he found the report materially defective he
would have no power to suspend the license." Thus, the Court concluded
that the hearing proposed by the district court would not add to the pro-
cedural safeguards already available.
The Court also found that such a hearing would not resolve any factual
disputes. First, the Court thought it unlikely that genuine factual disputes
would frequently arise." Chief Justice Burger noted that. Montrym's alleged
factual dispute was a legal one, namely whether the state court's finding that
the police later refused to administer the breathalyzer test was binding on the
Registrar as a matter of collateral estoppel."' Second, the Court pointed out
that if there were factual disputes, alerting the Registrar of their existence
would be pointless. Since all that Montrym sought was available immediately
following suspension," and since the procedures provided by the state con-
tained reasonable safeguards against. erroneous deprivation, the COurt. found
no reason to require a pre-suspension evidentiary hearing." Additionally,
the Montrym Court did not think the Massachusetts legislature's refusal to
allow a pre-suspension evidentiary hearing irrational.'" It pointed out
further that since the statute gives the Registrar no discretion to stay a license
suspension pending the outcome of an evidentiary hearing, it would be futile
to bring factual disputes before him prior to suspension.'
Having found the statutory procedures reasonable in their avoidance of
an erroneous deprivation of a protectible property interest, the Court ad-
dressed the last elements of the Eldridge test—the governmental function in-
volved. In so doing the Court evaluated the state interests served by the
summary procedures used in light of the possible administrative and fiscal
burdens which might arise from the use of the substitute procedures sought.
The Court noted that it has traditionally granted states substantial leeway in
adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety." It has
permitted summary seizures of property to protect public health or safety in
situations where delay would have defeated the government's objective." It
found that the Massachusetts statute, like that. in Love, is primarily concerned
with preserving highway safety. Thus, the Court concluded, as it did in Love,
that the state's interest in removing drunken drivers from the road justified
summary deprivation. 74
" 443 U.S. at 16.
" Id. at 14. The Court based this assumption on the fact that NIontrym (lid
not dispute his arrest. or the probable cause for his arrest. Id.
" Iii. at 14-15.
68 Id. at 15.
" Id. at 17.
70 Id.
7 ' Id. at 16.
72 Id. at 17. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
7"
 433 U.S. at 17-18. But see 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
74 433 U.S. at 19.
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The Court determined that the summary procedure of the implied con-
sent statute serves this important state interest in three ways: the threat of
summary sanction serves as a deterrent to drunk driving; it provides a strong
inducement to take the breathalyzer test and thus furthers the state's interest
in obtaining reliable evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings; and
the prompt removal of drivers who refuse to take the test contributes to the
safety of the highways." The Court found the summary and automatic
character of the suspension sanction to be critical in attaining these legitimate
objectives.
In addition to finding that a pre-suspension hearing would hinder the
state's interest in preserving highway safety, the Court found that such a hear-
ing would impose substantial administrative and fiscal burdens as well.' The
existence of a pre-suspension hearing process would likely encourage drivers
to refuse the breathalyzer test and demand a hearing as a dilatory tactic,
thereby resulting in a sharp increase in the number of hearings. Finally, such
an increase would considerably add to the cost and effort required by the
state." Thus, Chief Justice Burger found the state's compelling interest in
highway safety and its interest in avoiding undue administrative and fiscal
burdens sufficient justification for summary suspension of a license pending
the outcome of a prompt post-deprivation hearing. 78 The dissent in contrast
concluded that the state interests advanced did not meet the Court's previ-
ously articulated emergency exception to the requirement of a pre-deprivation
hearing.
B. The Diisent's Rationale
The dissenting opinion " emphasized prior decisions of the Court s°
which construed procedural due process to include a presumptive require-
ment of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to a state's
final deprivation of a person's property.'" It emphasized that where a depri-
vation is irreversible, as is the case with the suspension of a driver's license,
the requirement of some kind of hearing is all the more important." The
dissent noted the Court's prior ruling in Bell v. Burson, which held that except
in emergency situations the state must afford a prior hearing before a driver's
license may be suspended." It conceded that the dimensions of a prior hear-
ing could vary with the nature of the case, the interests affected, and the
prompt availability of adequate post-deprivation procedures." It insisted,
75 Id. at 18.
78 Id.
" Id.
78 Id. at 19.
" The opinion was written by justice Stewart and joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.
80
 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
g' 433 U.S. at 20.
82 Id. at 21.
83 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1970).
84
 433 U.S. at 21.
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nevertheless, that absent an emergency situation, a post-deprivation eviden-
tiary hearing was not constitutionally sufficient."
The dissent also argued that Dixon v. Love was not controlling." It noted
first that the appellee in Love had not contested the factual basis for his
license revocation or the procedures which followed. 87 Rather, the only issue
before the Court in Love was appellee's right to a leniency hearing in advance
of revocation." For this reason, the dissent stated that Love established no
broad exception to the normal presumption in favor of a prior hearing."
Furthermore, the dissent regarded the suspension procedures provided under
the Massachusetts statute as less reliable than those which formed the basis of
revocation in the Illinois statute involved in Love." It pointed out that license
revocation in Illinois was premised on a record of fully adjudicated convic-
tions for traffic violations.•' Under the Massachusetts statute, however,
license suspension is based solely on the affidavit of a police officer that the
driver had been arrested for drunken driving and has refused to take a
breathalyzer test. The dissent argued that the official records of criminal con-
victions relied upon in Love could not be equated with the unchallenged ob-
servations of a police officer." The dissent concluded that the revocation
scheme upheld by the Court in Love did not support the majority's approval
of the Massachusetts statute.
Nor did the dissent believe that the interests advanced by the state justify
ex parte action by the state in this instance." While recognizing that protect-
ing the public from unsafe drivers was a significant state interest, the dissent
argued that precedents for ex parte action have not turned simply on the sig-
nificance of the governmental interest asserted." Rather they have relied
upon the extent to which that interest will be frustrated by the delay necessi-
tated by a prior hearing." The dissent found that in this situation the statute
does nothing to remove drunken drivers from the road. The motorist who
takes the breathalyzer test and fails may keep his driver's license, a result
which the dissent found wholly at odds with the notion that summary suspen-
sion upon refusal to take the test serves any emergency purpose." The dis-
sent argued that suspension was premised not on intoxication but on non-
cooperation with the police." Thus, the dissent concluded that since there
13 Id. at 21-22.
86 Id. at 22. See text at note 39 supra. All of the justices partaking in the dis-







92 Id. at 24.
93 Id. at 25.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 26.
97 Id.
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was no emergency present, due process required the state to provide a hear-
ing prior to suspending a driver's license.
In addition to concluding that due process requires a prior hearing, the
dissent disagreed with the Court's conclusion that a prompt post-suspension
hearing is available." First, it pointed out that the suspension notice does not
mention the right to an immediate "walk-in" hearing." Second, it argued
that a meaningful hearing to resolve a factual dispute would require days to
assemble witnesses and the attesting officer."° Thus, the dissent found post-
suspension safeguards insufficiently prompt to comport with due process re-
quirements previously articulated by the Court.
III. THE DECISION IN PERSPECTIVE
In order to place the Montaym decision in proper perspective, it is neces-
sary to review procedural due process requirements as they existed prior to
Monhym. The Supreme Court has interpreted the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to require that absent a compelling emergency, notice
and an opportunity to be heard must be provided prior to the government's
seizure of a person's property.'°' The Court has established that due process
requires at a minimum that deprivations of protected property interests must
be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing "appropriate to the
nature of the case."'" The Court has further held that the opportunity for
such a hearing be provided "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner." t" In Fuentes v. Shevin "4 the Court insisted that even a temporary dep-
rivation is not exempt from the requirement of a prior hearing,'" even
though the property could shortly thereafter be returned to its owner.'" The
Court maintained that the "Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines
around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day deprivations of property ..." and held
that while the length and consequent severity of a deprivation could be
weighed in determining the appropriate form of a hearing, they are not de-
terminative of the basic right to a prior hearing."' Thus, a hearing must be
granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented.'"
Since due process normally requires notice and a hearing prior to a dep-
rivation of property, the more difficult task lbr the Court has been the de-
termination of what kind of hearing is required in a given situation. The
Court has acknowledged that a procedural rule which would satisfy due pro-
98 Id. at 27.
99 Id.
18" Id. at 28.
191 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"2 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
"3 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See generally Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
194
 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
"5
 Id. at 86.
o
107 Id.
' 08 Id. at 81.
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cess in one context might not satisfy procedural due process in another.'" In
considering such interests as the retention of welfare benefits, the Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly "° required a full evidentiary hearing prior to deprivation of
those benefits. 111 In Bell v. Burson, 12 however, where the interest involved
was retention of a driver's license, the Court was willing to tolerate a greater
risk of error and required only that the pre-revocation hearing involve a
probable cause determination short of adjudicating the question of habil-
In both instances the Court reached its holding by weighing the in-
terests of the parties affected in order to determine the requirements of due
process appropriate to the case.'"
While the Supreme Court generally has required that deprivations of
property must be preceded by the opportunity for a hearing, there have been
emergency situations in which the Court has found justification for postpon-
ing the requirements of notice and the opportunity to be heard. In these
situations an imminent threat to public health or welfare has existed and
delay would have rendered state efforts to remove the threat ineffectual. In
North American Cold Storage v. Chicago, 15 for example, the Court upheld sum-
mary seizures of contaminated food, reasoning that a city's duty to safeguard
the lives and health of its inhabitants necessitated the prompt action taken to
deal with the emergency. The Court noted that the property owner was enti-
tled to a - hearing after the seizure and could sue for damages for wrongful
deprivation."" Following a similar rationale, the Court has also upheld the
summary seizure of misbranded drugs."'
The Court has permitted ex parte seizures of property to avert bank fail-
ure 118 and to further the national war effort."`' In Fahey v. Mallonee 129 it
upheld a statute which permitted the government, upon receipt of allegations
of mismanagement by a bank's officers, to appoint a conservator of the bank's
assets.' 21 Noting banking's long history of government regulation and the
delicate nature of the banking business, the Court found the preservation of
the bank's credit during an investigation to be impossible without the state's
summary application of supervisory authority.' 22 Using a similar rationale,
the Court also has upheld the wartime seizure of securities believed to be
property of enemy aliens,' 29 reasoning that, as long as adequate provisions
"" Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
110 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
" 1 Id. at 264.
12 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
13 Id. at 542.
114 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 540-41; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263.
115 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
"1 " Id. at 316.
" 7 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
"" Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
'' Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
120 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
121 Id. at 253-54.
122
 Id. at 253.
123 Stoer v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan,
254 U.S. 554 (1921).
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existed for return of the property in case of mistake, such seizure was jus-
tified as part of the general war effort.'" Thus, the situations in which the
Court has found justification for postponing notice and a hearing have been
unique and unlikely to recur with any frequency or regularity.
Recently, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 125 the Court articulated the characteristics
of the few cases in which outright seizure has been permitted without a prior
hearing. On such occasions the seizure has been indispensable to secure an
important public or government interest," 6 prompt action has been crucia1, 127
and the seizure has been performed by a government official employing the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute.' 28 It therefore appears that the Court
continues to regard the emergency doctrine as applicable to only a narrow set
of circumstances. Absent these circumstances, government seizure of property
should be preceded by some form of hearing.
IV. ANALYTICAL AND PRECEDENTIAL PROBLEMS OF MONTRYM
In light of this background, an analysis of how the Montrym Court ap-
proached the three elements of the Eldridge test suggests that the Court's deci-
sion is not supported by its prior interpretations of the requirements of the
due process clause. The situation presented in Montrym is clearly distinguish-
able from that of Dixon v. Love. In addition, the interests asserted by the state
are not sufficiently compelling to fall within the traditional emergency excep-
tion to the normal presumption of a hearing prior to the deprivation of a
property interest. The end result is not, as the majority perceives it,'" that a
driver whose license is suspended by the Massachusetts statute has received
some sort of pre-deprivation objective review of the allegations against him.
Rather, as the dissent points out, 13 ° the Court has approved a procedure
which does not provide an opportunity for a hearing until after the property
has been taken away.
In applying the first step of the Eldridge test, the Court evaluated the
private interest at stake and defined the extent of a citizen's interest in his
driver's license in terms of the suspension statute itself. Looking at the statute,
the Court concluded that the interest involved in Montrym was less substantial
than that in Love because the Massachusetts statute provides for a post-
suspension hearing immediately following suspension while Illinois is not re-
quired to provide one for twenty days. 131 Thus, the Court clearly considered
the amount of deprivation in evaluating the substantiality of the private in-
terest. In Fuentes v. Shevin, however, the Court specifically declined to con-
sider the length of deprivation in defining the private interest at stake. 132 In
124 Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. at 566.
125
 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
126 Id. at 91.
l27
128 Id.
1214 443 U.S. at 16.
'" Id. at 25.
' 3 ' Id. at 12.
132
 407 U.S. at 84-85 (1972).
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Fuentes, the Court stated that while length of deprivation could be weighed to
determine the type of hearing, it is not determinate of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind. 133
A further difficulty with the Court's interest analysis is that it begs the
very question at issue. Montrym was challenging the statutory procedures
which the Court claimed were a part of the definition of the interest itself. An
argument that Montrym's interest was less substantial than that in Love be-
cause the wait for a post-suspension hearing was shorter ignores Montrym's
central claim that there should be no wait for a hearing at all, i.e. that the
hearing should be provided before the suspension takes place. Thus, by incor-
porating into the interest definition the very procedures which were chal-
lenged, the Court to a large degree settled the question of the need for a
prior hearing before it had even begun.
Unlike the dissent, the Court in weighing the private interest at stake
failed to reach the question of the availability of retroactive compensation in
the event of an erroneous deprivation. This failure is especially curious since
both the district court " 4 and the dissent 135 indicated that in prior cases the
Court had considered whether the wrongful deprivation of the interest at
stake could be completely compensated for retroactively. For example, in
Matthews v. Eldridge the availability of full retroactive relief fOr a recipient
whose Social Security benefits were wrongfully terminated greatly influenced
the Court's decision."6
 Conversely, in Bell v. Burson, where it would have
been impossible to restore to a driver the lost time during which he could not
drive, the Court concluded that a prior hearing must be afforded the licen-
see."' The majority in Mont)),In, however, considered that given the statutory
provision for an immediate post-suspension hearing, the duration of any pos-
sible wrongful deprivation would be short. As a result, it never considered the
possible necessity for retroactive relief.
The dissent, realistically doubting the availability of an immediate post-
.
deprivation hearing,'" recognized a greater likelihood of a lengthy depriva-
tion pending a hearing. Additionally, the availability of retroactive relief is an
important factor to be weighed. Since the loss of a driver's license, unlike the
loss of Social Security benefits, cannot ever be fully compensated for, the
Court should have considered the issue of retroactive relief, however short it
thought an erroneous deprivation might be.
In applying the second step of the Eldridge test, an assessment of the
likelihood of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of an additional
or substitute procedures, Chief Justice Burger relied heavily on the Court's
ruling in Dixon v. Love. The Court likened the procedure used under the
Massachusetts statute to those approved in Love, because it considered that in
both instances the suspension was based upon "objective facts." 139 The Court
133 Id. at 86.
134 Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Mass. 1977).
135 443 U.S. at 21-22.
1311 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
137 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
138 443 U.S. at 27.
139 Id. at 13.
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emphasized the objectivity of having two officers witness a licensee's refusal to
take a breathalyzer test.'" Yet, clearly, the crucial piece of evidence is the
arresting officer's determination that the driver is drunk, and the statute re-
quires no corroboration of this observation. The Court found that the of-
ficer's training renders him well-suited to make such determinations and that,
therefore, the risk of error is slight.' 4 ' Yet the Court in other contexts has
warned that "[z]eal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of
soberness of judgment," 142 and for that reason the Court has required that
the ex parte decisions of police officers be reviewed promptly by a magistrate
in order to effect a deprivation of liberty. 143 In essence, the Court found
that a determination by a police officer which alone is not sufficient to effect a
deprivation of liberty is sufficient to effect a deprivation of property.
While the Court has justified some ex parte initial deprivations of liberty
or property by the police—warrantless arrests, for instance—it has done so
only after recognizing the exigencies of law enforcement.'" Furthermore,
these initial deprivations must receive prompt review by an independent third
party, a magistrate.'" Under the Massachusetts statute, however, the Regis-
trar has no discretion upon receiving an officer's report of refusal to take a
breathalyzer test but "Itdpon receipt of such report, ... shall suspend any
license ... for a period of ninety days. " 146 Yet while the Court noted that.
the Registrar has no power to suspend a license if the officer's report is mate-
rially defective, 147 the Registrar's review of material defects is confined to see-
ing that the report on its face is not defective; it cannot extend beyond this
point. Therefore, any safeguard provided by the review is minimal.' 48
The Illinois summary suspension procedure involved in Love, on the
other hand, mandates license suspension only after a cumulative record of
traffic violations.'" As such, the licensee has had an opportunity for a full
14" Id. at 14. While the Court makes reference to a second officer witnessing the
licensee's refusal to take the test, the statute requires only that the refusal be witnessed
by a "third person. - It does not require that this person be a police officer. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch . 90, § 24(1)(6) (West Supp. 1979).
"' 443 U.S. at 14.
142 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
143 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Appellee's brief points out that in
this case, the officer did not even arrive at the scene until after the accident had
occurred, p. 49, and that his report set out no facts as to Montrym's driving behavior
or even that Nfontryin was involved in an accident. Brief for the Appellee at 46, 48.
144
 443 U.S. at 23.
145 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
20-22 (1968).
"" MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp. 1979).
147
 443 U.S. at 16.
1 " The Court suggests that "the arresting officer ordinarily will have provided
the driver with an informal opportunity to tell his side of the story." Id. at 14. It
offers, however, no authority to support its assertion. Even if the police officer had
offered a chance for explanation, the dissent questionS whether such action could
"seriously be deemed a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' in the due process
sense." Id. at 25.
1 " Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 108 & 11.3 (1977).
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judicial hearing in connection with each traffic violation. In essence, the objec-
tive facts upon which his license suspension is predicated have already been
given a hearing. As a result, the Court's holding in Love did not establish a
broad exception to the normal presumption in favor of a prior hearing.'"
Thus, Love could not serve as a precedent for the Court's holding in Montrym
where license suspension occurs automatically upon the Registrar's receipt of
a police officer's untested allegations.
The Court in Montrym noted further that the summary procedure was
justifiable because "as this case illustrates, there will rarely be any genuine
dispute as to the historical facts providing cause for a suspension." 15 ' The
basis for this conclusion, however, is unclear. The occasion would appear to
be ripe for just such disputes. As the dissent points out,'" there was indeed a
dispute over one of the material facts forming the basis of the suspension,
namely whether Montrym had been advised of the statute's sanction. Fur-
thermore, in Bell v. Burson, which involved the license suspension of an unin-
sured motorist who had been involved in an accident, the Court required the
state to provide the driver with an opportunity for a prior hearing to rebut
allegations of material fact.' 53 Certainly allegations by the licensee either that
the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he was intoxicated or
that he had not refused the test would be material under this statute.'" As
such, following Burson, the licensee should be provided an opportunity to
question assertions of such facts prior to suspension of his license.
In assessing the inherent risks of the procedures of the Massachusetts
statute in failing to provide for a pre-suspension hearing, the Court placed
great emphasis on the availability of a hearing immediately following license
suspension.' 55 If Montrym wished to allege errors, he could have done so on
the very same day.' 5 " Prior holdings of the Court have established that the
rapidity of administrative review and the duration of'any potentially wrongful
deprivation are important factors in assessing the sufficiency of the entire
process.'" They do not establish the proposition, however, that prompt
1 " 443 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 14.
152 Id. at 23. License suspension is premised on three factors: reasonable
grounds for arrest for driving while intoxicated; a proper request by the officer that
the driver take a breathalyzer test; and a refusal to do so by the driver after he has
been informed of the penalty for refusal. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90, § 24(1)(t)
(West Supp. 1979). Montrym contended that he was not informed of the sanction of
summary suspension, as required by § 24(1)(f), while the police affidavit contends that
he was.
153 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971).
154 Under the statute, these are in fact two of the issues which the licensee may
raise at the post-suspension hearing. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90, § 24(I)(g) (West
Supp. 1979).
155 443 U.S. at 15.
156 Id. at 5-6 n.5. It was stipulated by the parties that the § 24(1)(g) hearing was
available the moment the driver surrenders his license.
157 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (citing Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975)).
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post-deprivation review eliminates the need for any prior hearing at all.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the post-deprivation procedure hinges on
the property owner's notice of its existence.'" The Massachusetts statute
contains no provision for notifying the licensee of the availability of such a
hearing.'" In addition, the immediate post-suspension "walk-in" procedure
provides little more than a right to request the scheduling of a later hearing.
Any meaningful hearing to resolve a factual dispute would require time to
assemble witnesses during which time the driver's license would remain sus-
pended.'e° It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the safeguard of an im-
mediate post-suspension hearing would in fact be available to a licensee whose
license had been suspended.
It is thus very much open to question whether the procedure sanctioned
by the Court in Monitym sufficiently minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions
to meet procedural due process standards. Not only is the deprivation based
solely on one police officer's uncorroborated report of drunken driving, but
the Registrar's initial review of the report does not reach any issues material
to the deprivation beyond whether the officer's report on its face complies
with the requirements of the statute. The statute upheld in Love, on the other
hand, calls for license suspension only after the driver has compiled a record
of prior convictions."' In Burson the Court insisted that when the suspension
of the license of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an accident is at
issue, the state must provide a pre-suspension hearing considering the issue of
fault."' Thus, the procedures the Court approved in Montrym stand in sharp
contrast to those approved in Love or mandated in Burson.
When weighing the governmental interest involved, the third step of the
Eldridge test, Chief Justice Burger likens the interests advanced under the
Massachusetts statute to those at issue in Love.'" His conclusion, however,
that there is a similarity of interests which justifies upholding the Mas-
sachusetts summary suspension scheme does not follow either from the facts
of Love or from prior holdings of the Court. Both the Massachusetts and
Illinois statutes seek to remove from the road drivers who pose a threat to
highway safety. This end is indeed accomplished by the Illinois statute. Driv-
ers whose licenses would be suspended under the Illinois statute are those
with a prior record of at least three moving traffic violations within a
twelve-month period. 164 In contrast, under the Massachusetts scheme no
prior record of unsafe driving is required to trigger license suspension. 15 All
that is needed is an arresting officer's report that there was probable cause to
arrest the driver for driving while intoxicated, that the driver was in fact ar-
'' 443 U.S. at 27.
' 5" Id. The dissent called attention to the Court's recent affirmation of the re-
quirement of "reasonable" notice as an integral element of due process. Id. at 25-26.
See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1978).
"" 433 U.S. at 28.
" 1
 431 U.S. at 108 n.3.
1' 2
 402 U.S. at 540.
1 " 443 U.S. at 17.
"4
 431 U.S. at 108 n.3.
' 65
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Stipp. 1979).
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rested, and that he refused to take a breathalyzer test. Thus, there is no
ground to conclude that the Massachusetts summary suspension scheme
makes the same contribution to highway safety as does the Illinois statute.
The majority also compared the governmental interests served by the
Massachusetts statute to those emergency situations where the Court has per-
mitted summary seizures of private property.'" Chief Justice Burger com-
ments that "[s]tates surely have at least as much interest in removing drunken
drivers from their highways as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or de-
stroying spoiled foodstuffs." 167
 This statement assumes that the operation of
the statute effectively accomplishes the state's purpose of removing drunken
drivers from the road. In fact, as the dissent maintained,'" the statute re-
moves from the road only those drivers who refuse to take the breathalyzer
test, whether intoxicated or not. An intoxicated driver who fails the
breathalyzer test retains his license, a result which belies the Court's assertion
that the summary suspension of the driver's license serves an emergency pro-
tective purpose.'• To the contrary, as the dissent points out, the main
accomplishment of the statute is the punishment of drivers who refuse to coop-
erate with the police.'" Furthermore, since the statute mandates license sus-
pension for all drivers arrested for drunken driving who refuse to take the
test, it is much broader than the narrowly drawn statutes which have been
upheld as serving an emergency purpose.
In addition, the Court upheld the statute as a justifiable deterrent to
drunken driving, as a method of obtaining reliable and relevant evidence, and
as a method of preventing dilatory tactics on the part of the licensee."'
Approval of such goals as valid emergency interests, however, considerably
expands a' previously narrow exception to the normal requirement of a pre-
deprivation hearing. As noted above, 172 the precedents for ex parte depriva-
tions of property by the state have required situations where a significant gov-
ernment interest, such as the health of its citizenry, has been posed with a
threat requiring immediate action. These cases do not suggest that the collect-
ing of evidence would fall within the scope of such emergency interests. The
dissent argued that the fourteenth amendment exists to provide the pro-
cedural rights which would prevent coercive tactics ' 7 ' such as threatening a
166 See text at note 115 supra.
167
 443 U.S. at 17. In justifying the summary suspension procedure as an
emergency measure, the Court adopts a position not even advanced by the appellant.
The state argued in its brief that it "relies upon the implied consent sanction not as a
narrow emergency measure for instantaneous removal of the intoxicated driver from
the road, but as a mechanism to advance a variety of deterrent, punitive, and re-
habilitative measures." Brief for the Appellant at 33.
168 443 U.S. at 28.
169 Id. Appellee noted in his brief the recent enactment of a Driver Education
Alcohol Program, under which convicted drunken drivers are enrolled in an educa-
tional rehabilitative program rather than receive license' suspensions. A special commis-
sion investigating the matter found license suspension an ineffective means of control-
ling drunk driving. Brief for the Appellee at 68.
170
 443 U.S. at 26.
tii Id. at 18.
172 See text at note 115 supra.
' 73 443 U.S. at 26.
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driver with license suspension for refusal to take a breathalyzer test. While it
is probably true that such a threat, if known to a driver, would indeed en-
courage cooperation, that result should not automatically justify the means
employed. However "critical" the summary suspension scheme may be to the
state's objectives, 174
 these objectives clearly do not fall within the narrow class
which has justified the emergency exception to fourteenth amendment protec-
tion. The Court's approval of the Massachusetts statute could open the door
to state assertion of other non-emergency interests as justification for suspend-
ing pre-deprivation hearings.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE MONTRYAI DECISION AND A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
As the preceding analysis reveals, the Montrym decision has modified sig-
nificantly the traditional due process requirement of notice and hearing prior
to the deprivation of a property interest. No longer will the private individual
with a property interest at stake be assured of sonic type of prior hearing as a
matter of right. Instead, the Court now appears to require that private prop-
erty interests outweigh the state interests served by summary process in order
to merit any type of pre-deprivation hearing. Such a position constitutes an
abandonment of the traditional emergency doctrine, which permits summary
deprivations of property only when the state advances a significant public in-
terest requiring immediate state action.
To achieve this modification, the Montrym Court fashioned the Eldridge
balancing approach into a new due process substantiality test, The Court
employed this test to determine not merely the kind of hearing required, as it
did in Eldridge, " 5 but the timing of that hearing as well. Although the Court in
Montrym considered the private interest at stake and the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used in a traditional manner, it increased
dramatically the types of government interests to be considered in the third
step of the balancing test. In Eldridge and previous cases,'" the Court
evaluated only the state's administrative burden of providing more elaborate
hearing procedures. In Montrym, however, the Court placed other government
interests in the scale to weigh against the private interests at stake in deter-
mining whether any form of pre-deprivation hearing was required. Chief Jus-
tice Burger weighed not only administrative costs but also the state's interests
in general highway safety, in discouraging drunk driving, and in obtaining
reliable evidence for subsequent prosecutions,' 77 interests which would not
previously have been sufficient to justify forgoing notice and an opportunity
to be heard. In Montrym, however, the Court concluded that these interests do
just that. Because Montrym failed to demonstrate that his property interest
was more substantial than the state interests involved, he was required to wait
until after license suspension for any hearing. Thus, it appears that no pre-
deprivation hearing will be required unless the private individual can dem-
174
 Id. at 18.
13 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
176
 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
265 (1970).
177
 443 U.S. at 18.
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onstrate that his property interests are more substantial than the interests ad-
vanced by the state.
The effect of the Court's new approach to due process analysis is evi-
denced by the case of Barry v. Barchi,' 78 decided the same day as Mackey v.
Montrym. The Court upheld in part a New York State Racing and Wagering
Board rule permitting summary suspension of a horse trainer's license upon
the Board's receipt of post-race test results revealing the presence of a stimu-
lant drug in the system of the trainer's horse.'" These rules established an
evidentiary presumption that if such a drug were found in a horse's system,
the horse's trainer was responsible or at least negligent.'" Not citing Mathews
v. Eldridge but employing essentially the same balancing test, the Court
weighed the state's interest in preserving the integrity of horse racing carried
on under its auspices against a trainer's interest in his occupational license.
The Court. concluded that the state's "important interest in assuring the integ-
rity of the racing carried on under its auspices" 181 justified the use of a sum-
mary, interim suspension. The Barchi decision thus demonstrates that the
Court's catalogue of significant state interests justifying summary deprivations
of property has expanded far beyond what has traditionally been considered
an emergency interest.
In concluding that Massachusetts need not provide Montrym with any
prior hearing beyond the minimal safeguards available under the suspension
statute, Chief Justice Burger strongly implied that the only alternative proce-
dure would be to have a full evidentiary hearing.' 82 The Court found that
such a procedure would unduly hinder the state's achievement of its objec-
tives. 1 e` In Bell v. Burson, however, the Court found it possible for a state to
provide a hearing procedure which could consider the question of probable
cause without becoming a full evidentiary hearing.'" Indeed, it insisted that
a pre-deprivation hearing must, in this context, make some inquiry into the
matter of fault of the licensee and that, absent such an inquiry, the state could
not summarily remove a driver's licensc. 185 Since both the private property
interest and the potential loss to the licensee in Montrym are the same as those
at issue in Burson, the Court was inconsistent to conclude that the only
reasonable alternative to the Registrar's review was a full evidentiary hearing.
It should, therefore, be possible for a state to provide a pre-suspension
hearing without unduly burdening the attainment of legitimate state objec-
tives. Such a hearing initially need not be a full evidentiary affair, but instead
could follow the guidelines set forth in Burson. There the Court insisted that
before a motorist's license could be suspended, he should be permitted a hear-
ing considering the material issues in the case. In that instance the Court
concluded that a hearing considering whether there was a reasonable possibil-
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ity that judgment could be returned against the uninsured driver must be
provided.' 86
In the circumstances of Montrym, the state could provide a pre-
deprivation hearing to consider the following material factors: whether prob-
able cause of driver intoxication existed; whether the driver had been ar-
rested; whether he had been given the appropriate warnings concerning the
statutory sanctions which could be imposed; and whether, after receiving such
warnings, he refused to take the test. License suspension would he delayed
only upon a finding of a reasonable likelihood that any one of these elements
was lacking. If such a delay was found warranted, the state should provide the
licensee with the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to suspension.
Absent such findings, license suspension could occur immediately, with a sub-
sequent opportunity for a full hearing. In this manner, the state could
reasonably guard against the possibility of erroneous deprivations, while at the
same time expeditiously fulfilling its worthy goal of preserving highway safety.
CONCLUSION
In Montrym the Court held that a statute mandating summary ex parte
suspension of a driver's license upon the licensee's refusal to take a
breathalyzer test after being arrested for driving under the influence of intox-
icating liquor did not violate the due process clause. The Court's holding is a
significant modification of traditional due process doctrine in that. it expands
the circumstances under which a state may deprive an individual of a prop-
erty interest without affording that individual an opportunity for a prior hear-
ing. The Court's use of the Eldridge balancing test suggests that, as long as a
state provides a prompt post-deprivation hearing a wide variety of state in-
terests may now justify an initial ex parte deprivation of private property. The
emergency exception to the traditional due process requirements of notice
and a hearing has ceased to be an exception, and a citizen can no longer
expect a pre-deprivation hearing as a matter of right. Instead, he will have to
demonstrate that his property interest is more substantial than the interests
advanced by the state. Montrym indicates that a license to drive is not suffi-
ciently substantial to justify the administrative burden of a pre-deprivation
hearing when a driver has been accused of drunken driving. Whether other
property interests will lose their traditional protections must await further de-
cisions.
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